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Risk&Regulation, Summer 2011  b 
Annelise Riles walks us 
through a conflict of laws 
approach to financial regulation. 
AmeRican inteRnational GRoup (aiG), the very name of this company screams out its uS origins. and yet, the traders within the uK 
subsidiary of this multinational insurance corporation, 
operating under a French banking licence, were 
able to engage in risk-taking activities that were 
largely beyond the reach of uS insurance and finance 
regulators. When aiG’s london-based trades fell 
apart in 2008, the parent institution in the uS – and 
hence the uS taxpayers – found themselves on the 
hook for decisions made in aiG’s overseas subsidiary. 
in the world of financial regulation, national financial 
regulators are pit against a globally mobile financial 
system. Since 2008, regulators have made a 
concerted effort to address the national regulatory 
differences that made aiG’s trades possible in the 
first place. new rules hammered out at the G20 that 
seek to address these challenges apply to banks. 
How have the markets responded? Financiers have 
simply found ways of booking their transactions 
through non-bank institutions, the shadow banks 
not subject to the G20’s rules.
the regulatory challenge posed by both aiG and 
the shadow banking industry is of paramount 
importance because the international slipperiness 
of these institutions, which are beyond the reach 
of regulators, threatens the sovereignty of nation-
states and the well-being of national economies. 
However, the tension between regulators and 
financiers is somewhat more complicated than 
the law makers versus law evaders dichotomy. 
this is because a patchy regulatory landscape is 
fully anticipated within the core business model 
of global finance. 
playinG ReGulatoRy diFFeRenceS is an 
important way of generating financial advantage. 
the technical term for this is “regulatory 
arbitrage”.
in economic theory ‘arbitrage’ is considered a 
significant activity quite distinct from its lesser cousin, 
‘speculation’. indeed, arbitrage is one of the great 
singular achievements of economic thought. 
the general art of arbitrage is to spot similarities 
across what look like differences at first glance: a 
basket of stocks and an index, the rules of one legal 
system and those of another. From the perspective 
of economic theory, the investment strategy behind 
regulatory arbitrage is exactly the same as in other 
kinds of arbitrage in which an investment opportunity 
is created by a discrepancy in the relative price of 
two investments otherwise deemed similar. So 
what’s the problem with regulatory arbitrage? For 
one, it can create a race to the bottom as investors 
move their transactions to the locality with the most 
favourable rules. 
the prevailing wisdom is that regulatory arbitrage can 
be counteracted only if the rules across all legal systems 
are harmonized. in other words, regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities will be eliminated if the regulatory cost of 
transacting is identical in all places. in practice, however, 
changing national laws is an extremely contentious 
process. attempts to universalize substantive regulation 
can quickly devolve into regulatory nationalism as 
domestic political and economic interests clash with 
international expectations. What is more, the process 
of harmonization risks creating new regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities since the pace of enacting legal change 
will differ across states.
What if international regulatory harmonization at 
the level of nation-states is an unattainable goal? 
What non-lawyers may not know is that the law 
is equipped with sophisticated tools for dealing 
with persistent regulatory differences – tools like 
“party autonomy in choice of law”, the rule that 
says parties get to pick the law that applies to 
their contracts. However, as discussed in my book 
Collateral Knowledge (2011), the rules we currently 
use favour the financial industry. the industry has 
worked hard to ensure that judges and academics 
who make these rules see things its way.
tHe tool i’m tHinKinG oF is a technical and 
arcane, but ingenious invention known as conflict 
of laws within common law, or “private international 
law” in civil law. conflict of laws is the name given 
to the well established body of law that determines 
which law should apply in situations where more 
than one sovereign state can arguably lay claim to a 
problem. For example: What law governs a contract 
between a bank in london and another bank in the 
cayman islands concerning assets in Singapore, and 
executed over the internet? the answer is found in 
the conflict of laws. 
unlike the harmonization paradigm which pursues 
legal uniformity, the “conflicts approach” accepts 
that regulatory nationalism is a fact of life, and sets for 
itself the more modest goal of achieving coordination 
among different national regimes. this alternative 
approach to international regulatory coordination 
originated to stabilize trade relations after the fall 
of the Roman empire and has thus developed 
over centuries.
under the conflicts approach the point is not to define 
one set of rules that apply for all, as is the case in public 
international law –the law of international organizations 
such as the un or the Wto. Rather, it is simply to define 
under which circumstance should a particular dispute 
or problem be subject to one state’s law or another. 
thinking in terms of ‘conflict of laws’ changes the 
debate over global financial regulation because it 
raises an altogether different set of questions that are 
largely being ignored. For example: How far does each 
regulatory jurisdiction extend, and what should be 
done when there is overlap? When should so-called 
host regulators of a global, systemically important 
financial institution defer to so-called home regulators? 
thinking about conflicts between laws encourages 
us to more carefully examine how we allocate 
authority across the existing regulatory regimes. 
the approach gives us another way of examining, 
and therefore of challenging, the scope of national, 
international, and non-state regulation. after all, 
when regulators or market participants make a 
claim about the application of one or another body 
of laws to a given party or transaction, they are 
effectively making an implicit claim about what the 
scope of their national law should be. 
the highly technical quality of the field of conflicts law 
makes it quite intimidating to some. as the esteemed 
Judge Weinstein, the Federal district court judge 
who has handled the agent orange litigation as well 
as numerous other intractable mass tort cases, from 
breast implants to tobacco lawsuits, once famously 
said: “if i want the parties to settle a dispute i say 
‘Hmm … there must be a conflict of laws issue 
in this question.’” yet, the very technical quality of 
the conflicts approach provides a much needed 
vocabulary, a register for moving beyond overt politics 
in the discussion of international financial regulation. 
i’m interested in what the conflicts approach can do 
in the sphere of financial regulation precisely because 
it transforms political questions into technical legal 
issues that can be managed within the scope of the 
existing national law.  
FoR tHe pReSent, one could think of the conflicts 
approach as an alternative form of global regulation 
prior to our achieving the utopian ideal of pure 
international integration. in an interview with Risk 
magazine, Barney Reynolds, a partner at Sherman 
& Sterling london working in this area has argued: 
“i don’t think in our lifetimes you’ll get a global 
insolvency regime, but you might get a global 
agreement on a ‘conflict of laws and regulation’ 
rule, so as to determine which country’s insolvency 
regime takes precedence in certain situations.”
in my opinion, there are many appealing advantages 
to this approach over the G20 model of full legal 
harmonization. From a legal standpoint, paying 
attention to the rules and processes that should 
govern the allocation of regulatory authority among 
overlapping sovereign states is hardly a second best 
option for mitigating the harm of regulatory arbitrage. 
First and foremost, conflict of laws takes an agonistic 
view of the claim that there is a single overarching 
“right answer” to what the rules of regulation should 
be. the doctrines of conflict of laws instruct judges 
always to be aware that their own perspective is 
situated and partial, and that a judge in another 
jurisdiction could and most likely would think of 
the dispute in different terms. this built-in pluralism 
contrasts with a significant weakness of the G20’s 
efforts at global financial regulatory harmonization 
– its tendency to fall into north atlantic cliquishness.
Secondly, the conflicts approach is case driven. 
it builds coordination from the ground up rather 
than from top down. cases are presented to 
courts as they develop, which allows problems 
to be addressed immediately, rather than wait for 
long-term harmonization. this has the added benefit 
of allowing for greater participation in the process 
of generating consensus, since cases are defined 
and argued by the litigants themselves, through 
their established local legal representatives who 
need not act in an internationally unified manner.
thirdly, in contrast to substantive financial regulatory 
standards that must be painstakingly decided, 
there exists considerable agreement on the formal 
rules of both private international law and conflict of 
laws. Some differences of philosophy are present 
between the american approach through common 
law and that of civil law. But on the whole, a great 
deal is already shared.
last but certainly not least, the switch to thinking in 
terms of conflict of laws does not require new legislation. 
nor does it need new agreements be hammered out 
at global conferences among regulators. implementing 
a conflicts approach requires nothing more forceful 
than the creative application of laws that are already 
part of the legal system of all of the nations in which 
major financial centres are found. 
So WHy HaSn’t conFlict oF laWS Been 
puRSued in financial regulation? the explanation 
is what Gillian tett calls “silo thinking”: specialists on 
the conflict of laws have been traditionally confined 
to cases on inheritance, marriage, land disputes, 
private contracts and the like because historically 
those were the problems that crossed borders. as 
people migrated, and emerging european states 
had to determine which law would govern various 
aspects of these migrants’ lives. in those days, 
transnational economic relations were confined to 
such issues as mercantile agreements (contracts). 
this is why conflicts experts are trained to handle 
problems in private shipping contracts, but they 
know very little about financial regulation. For their 
part, financial regulation experts know next to 
nothing about the conflict of laws, if they are even 
aware it exists.
Playing regulatory differences is an important 
way of generating financial advantage. The 
technical term for this is ‘regulatory arbitrage’.
MAnAging RegulAtoRy 
ARbitRAge:  
an alternative to harmonization
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of incorporation. it is also narrow. in this definition, 
a free-standing corporation based in the cayman 
islands, all of whose shares are held by a uS entity 
would not qualify as a uS institution. 
What is most important to the industry is the 
formal rule-like quality of iSda’s proposal 
because arbitrage, financial or legal, feeds on 
clear categories. you can only find arbitrage 
opportunities when you can see clear differences 
between assets or regulatory authorities. in other 
words, it is more important to the industry to 
be absolutely certain that uS law will not apply 
somewhere else – so that transactions can be 
confidently booked or financial entities established, 
outside the uS. 
in contrast, public advocacy groups such as 
americans for Financial Reform have proposed a 
highly functional definition of a uS institution. in their 
view, a uS institution is any institution whose failure 
would substantially impact the uS economy. the 
functional approach of advocacy groups strikes 
fear in the heart of foreign regulators because of 
its breadth and hence the potential for overlap 
between uS and foreign regulatory authority.
to date, the cFtc has responded in a highly 
technocratic way. according to one prong of 
the cFtc’s complex proposal, a foreign branch 
of a uS financial institution will qualify as a uS 
institution, but a foreign subsidiary of a uS financial 
institution will not. note that industry can live with 
this distinction since it is often possible, using 
sophisticated legal technologies, to reproduce 
many of the functions of a foreign branch in the 
form of a foreign subsidiary. 
But there is another piece to the cFtc proposal 
which is more innovative and controversial. the 
cFtc has further proposed that foreign institutions 
that transact with such “uS persons” can apply, 
on an individual, institution by institution basis, for 
exemption from uS regulation based on the fact 
that they are already in compliance with a body of 
foreign regulation that is functionally analogous to 
uS law. this is called “substituted compliance”.
What is new about the cFtc proposal is that 
substituted compliance will be determined, firm by 
firm, rather than by country. thus, one Japanese 
bank may qualify while another may not. this 
has ruffled the feathers of foreign regulators 
who see the legal test as an infringement on 
their national sovereignty. if Japanese regulators 
have determined that two of their banks are in 
compliance with Japanese regulation, who is the 
cFtc to judge them differently?
But the creative insight of the conflicts approach is 
precisely that of handling problems case by case. 
in fact, the conflicts perspective would take the 
matter one important step further. the question 
of whether a financial institution is or is not a uS 
person or of whether a foreign institution should or 
should not be entitled to substituted compliance 
depends not solely upon the status of the person, 
but upon the legal issue at stake in the case. 
the conflicts approach asks: “What turns on this 
legal distinction?” are we determining, for example, 
whether the parties need to post a certain size 
margin? or whether uS anti-fraud provisions of 
dodd-Frank should apply? 
L et’s consider a controversial example to see how a financial regulator might use conflict of laws thinking in determining whether or not 
a certain transaction or a certain party, should be 
subject to their regulatory authority. 
in europe and asia, regulators are concerned 
with the so-called “extraterritorial reach” of the 
proposed regulations of the uS commodity 
Futures trading commission (cFtc), which has 
indisputable authority over the uS over-the-counter 
(otc) swap markets under the dodd-Frank act. 
What then should determine the cFtc’s 
extraterritorial reach? the agency has taken an 
interesting approach that in some way exemplifies 
the promise and the challenge of the conflict of laws 
approach. it has proposed that any transactions 
with uS persons shall be subject to uS law and 
regulation. note the technical legal sophistication 
of this position; it focuses on particular transactions 
and particular subjects (persons). this shifts the 
debate from a political question into a technical 
one: What is a uS person?
on behalf of industry, the international Swaps 
and derivatives association (iSda) has proposed 
a highly formalistic rule: a uS person should be 
an institution whose principal place of business 
is in the uS. 
this is the old Basel i principle of “home country 
oversight” according to which uS banks, including 
their foreign branches, are subject to uS regulation, 
while uS branches of foreign financial institutions 
are not. it is formalistic because it piggy-backs 
on a formal legal definition of territory and place 
AppLicAtion 
What should determine the 
extraterritorial reach of US law?
now try a third fact pattern: let’s imagine there is 
no regulation comparable to the dodd-Frank act 
in the foreign jurisdiction where the transaction 
occurs. if both jurisdictions are legitimately 
interested, the regulator will have to resort to 
some tie-breaking principles. it could perhaps 
negotiate with foreign counterparties.
We have walked through only one small piece 
of a proper conflicts analysis. nevertheless, this 
extreme simplification is enough to highlight the 
key advantage of such an approach: it transforms 
a highly political determination into a technical legal 
one. in so doing it forces a serious, albeit technical 
inquiry, into the relative interests of each jurisdiction 
whose laws may apply in a given case. this strikes 
me as a viable alternative means of coordinating 
and reaching compromise between international 
regulatory authorities. 
most importantly, a conflicts approach to transnational 
regulatory coordination makes regulatory arbitrage far 
more difficult and expensive, and hence reduces the 
amount of regulatory arbitrage that will occur. When 
legal analysis is issue-specific (instead of imposed by 
arbitrary rules) the cost of regulatory arbitrage goes 
up dramatically because regulatory arbitrageurs 
cannot simply produce and mass market one size 
fits all arbitrage products. Regulatory arbitrage 
will always be a possibility in some cases, but the 
additional cost of legal analysis and therefore the 
cost of prediction will eliminate many opportunities. 
this is a medium-sized, but important victory for 
transnational regulatory cooperation.
Annelise Riles is the Jack G 
clarke professor of law in Far 
east legal Studies and professor 
of anthropology at cornell 
university. Her most recent book 
is Collateral knowledge (2011), 
university of chicago press. 
adapted by Martha poon, R&R editor.
this is obviously very different from the formalist 
approach to the scope of national law. What is 
perhaps less obvious is how the conflicts approach 
also differs from the functional test for determining 
which entities will be subject to uS regulation, 
proposed by public advocacy groups. 
in order to see how it is different, let’s make our 
hypothetical example even more specific. imagine 
a simple swap transaction between a subsidiary 
of a uS institution located in a foreign country and 
an institution in that country. is the subsidiary a uS 
person for purposes of margin rules? there are 
many technical steps that the conflicts approach 
would go through to answer this question, but we 
only need to work through one to have the gist of 
a conflicts analysis. 
take the step called “interest analysis”. as the 
name suggests this is a technical approach to the 
question, “What is really at stake in this choice? 
What interests are involved?” in the case of our 
swap transaction, the conflicts doctrine directs the 
regulator to ask, “What are the purposes behind 
this margin rule?” as it turns out, the commodity 
exchange act as revised by dodd-Frank is quite 
clear on this point. the purpose of the rule is to avoid 
future taxpayer bailouts by ensuring that financial 
institutions bear the cost of their risky behaviour. 
the conflicts approach would then query, “What is 
the relevant contact that would determine whether 
this interest legitimately comes into play in this case?” 
Here again, a clear answer emerges. the relevant 
contact is the potential for uS taxpayer liability. 
the third step is for the regulator to ask, “is there 
potential for uS taxpayer liability such that the uS 
has an interest in applying its law?” the answer 
again is clearly, ‘yes’. if this subsidiary of a uS 
institution gets into financial trouble, the liability will 
flow back to the uS and ultimately to uS taxpayers. 
But that is only the first prong of the analysis. the 
conflicts approach would then direct the regulator to 
go through the same thought process with respect 
to the other jurisdiction that might apply its law. 
instead of resorting to a functional decision about 
whether uS law applies, it recognizes the existence 
of other regulatory authorities. it acknowledges 
that defining the scope of extraterritorial authority 
is really a question of how to share authority with 
another regulator. 
in our example, the other possible regulatory 
authority would be the foreign jurisdiction where 
the subsidiary and the foreign financial institution 
were located and where the transaction is taking 
place. now let’s imagine the foreign jurisdiction 
has its own margin rule with largely the same 
purpose. the uS regulator could determine there 
is no substantial conflict between uS and foreign 
law. Hence the uS can and should go ahead and 
apply its law. 
But let’s change the facts just a little bit: imagine that 
the foreign regulatory authority has no comparable 
margin rule, but the transaction is booked in a third 
jurisdiction. in this case, the regulator should ask, 
“Why did this foreign jurisdiction choose not to have 
a margin rule like ours?” after some comparative 
investigation he or she might determine that 
policy-makers in the foreign jurisdiction were more 
concerned about attracting business than they were 
about protecting national taxpayers. But since the 
transaction in question is actually occurring in a third 
jurisdiction and is arguably not bringing business to 
the foreign jurisdiction we can conclude the foreign 
jurisdiction has no legitimate interest in applying 
its law. By this reasoning, the uS regulator should 
proceed with the determination that the transaction 
involves a “uS person” and hence is subject to uS 
margin rules. MP/DU
